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________________                              
 
  OPINION 
________________                              
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 This case comes to us a second time and requires that 
we consider the constitutionality of the recordkeeping, 
labeling, and inspection requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2257 and 2257A (collectively, “the Statutes”) and their 
accompanying regulations, 28 C.F.R. §§ 75.1–75.9.  Because 
the administrative search regime imposed by regulation 
violates the Fourth Amendment as applied to Plaintiffs, we 
will affirm in part and vacate in part the District Court’s 
judgment as to those claims.  We will also affirm in part the 
District Court’s judgment that the Statutes and regulations do 
not violate the First Amendment.  In light of our conclusion 
that the Government must obtain a warrant before conducting 
a search under the Statutes, however, we will remand to the 
District Court to consider whether 28 C.F.R. § 75.5(c)(1)’s 
additional requirement that producers make their records 
available for at least twenty hours per week also violates the 
First Amendment. 
I. 
 Since 1984, Congress has criminalized both the 
commercial and noncommercial use of children in sexually 
explicit materials.  See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. 
(FSC I), 677 F.3d 519, 525 (3d Cir. 2012) (describing 
legislative efforts to criminalize child pornography).  But 
 5 
 
despite these direct prohibitions of using underage models in 
sexually explicit materials, producers of sexually explicit 
materials continued to utilize youthful-looking performers.  
See id. at 525–26 (citing Attorney General’s Commission on 
Pornography, Final Report, 618 (1986)).  Law enforcement 
was ill-equipped visually to ascertain these performers’ ages, 
and the risk that children were still being used in 
pornographic materials remained.  Id. 
 Congress thus decided to place the onus on producers 
to collect information demonstrating that their performers 
were not minors.  Enacted as part of the Child Protection and 
Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 
§ 7513, 102 Stat. 4181, 4487, § 2257 as amended requires 
producers of visual depictions of “actual sexually explicit 
conduct” to keep “individually identifiable records” 
documenting the identity and age of every performer 
appearing in those depictions.  18 U.S.C. § 2257(a).  Section 
2257A, enacted as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 503, 120 Stat. 
587, extended similar recordkeeping requirements to 
producers of depictions of “simulated sexually explicit 
conduct.”  “Sexually explicit conduct” for the purposes of 
both § 2257 and § 2257A consists of “(i) sexual intercourse, 
including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-
anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; 
(ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic 
abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic 
area of any person.”  18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A); see also 28 
C.F.R. § 75.1(n).  Performers engage in simulated sexually 
explicit conduct if a “reasonable viewer” would believe that 
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the performers had engaged in the sexually explicit conduct 
defined above.  28 C.F.R. § 75.1(o).1   
 Producers of visual depictions subject to the Statutes 
are required to examine “an identification document” for each 
performer and maintain records listing each performer’s 
name, date of birth, and any other name that the performer 
has previously used.  18 U.S.C. § 2257(b); id. § 2257A(b).  
These records must be maintained at the producer’s “business 
premises,” or at any other place prescribed by regulation, and 
shall be made available for inspection by the Attorney 
General “at all reasonable times.”  Id. § 2257(c); id. 
§ 2257A(c).  Producers must also “affix[] to every copy” of 
covered depictions “in such manner and in such form as the 
Attorney General shall by regulations prescribe, a statement 
describing where the records required . . . with respect to all 
performers depicted in that copy . . . may be located.”  Id. 
§ 2257(e)(1); id. § 2257A(e)(1). 
                                                 
1 Certain commercial producers of simulated sexually explicit 
depictions, along with some commercial producers of images 
that depict the actual lascivious exhibition of the genitals or 
pubic area regulated under § 2257, are exempt from these 
recordkeeping requirements.  18 U.S.C. § 2257A(h).  These 
exemptions are intended to apply to industries where 
Congress believed that existing regulatory schemes already 
“adequately achieve[d] the same age-verification ends as the 
Statutes,” such as the mainstream motion picture and 
television industries.  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 535 n.11; see also 
152 Cong. Rec. S8012, S8027 (July 20, 2006) (statement of 
Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
 7 
 
 Detailed regulations further refine the recordkeeping 
and labeling requirements under the Statutes.  Pursuant to 
these regulations, producers must maintain “a legible hard 
copy” of the identification documents examined for each 
performer, as well as a copy of each sexually explicit 
depiction.  28 C.F.R. § 75.2(a)(1).  Producers must also 
generate an index tying each depiction to all names used by 
each performer.  Id. § 75.2(a)(2)–(3); id. § 75.3.  To comply 
with these requirements, producers are permitted to contract 
with a third party for record-retention purposes.  Id. § 75.2(h); 
id. § 75.4.  Regulations further specify where the statement 
describing the records’ location must be affixed for each copy 
of a sexually explicit depiction, along with the contents of 
that statement.  Id. § 75.6; id. § 75.8.  
The Statutes’ general command that records be 
available for inspection “at all reasonable times,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2257(c); id. § 2257A(c), is also governed by detailed 
regulations.  Investigators are “authorized to enter without 
delay and at reasonable times any establishment of a producer 
where records . . . are maintained to inspect during regular 
working hours and at other reasonable times, and within 
reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, for the purpose 
of determining compliance” with the Statutes.  28 C.F.R. 
§ 75.5(a).  Although inspections are to be conducted either 
during normal business hours or at such times that the 
producer “is actually conducting business” related to covered 
depictions, producers must nevertheless make their records 
available for inspection for at least twenty hours per week.  
Id. § 75.5(c). 
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Inspectors are further required by regulation to take 
several steps at the time a search is conducted to reassure 
producers of the lawfulness of any search.  These include 
presenting credentials and explaining the limited nature and 
purpose of the inspection.  Id. § 75.5(c)(2).  The frequency of 
inspections is also circumscribed:  only one inspection is 
permitted during any four-month period, unless law 
enforcement has “reasonable suspicion” that a violation has 
occurred.  Id. § 75.5(d).  Although “inspections shall be 
conducted so as not to unreasonably disrupt” operations, id. 
§ 75.5(c)(3), the regulations also mandate that “[a]dvance 
notice of record inspections shall not be given.”  Id. § 75.5(b).   
Failure to maintain the necessary records, to affix the 
necessary statement describing the records’ location to each 
copy of a regulated depiction, or to permit a required 
inspection are criminal offenses.  28 U.S.C. § 2257(f); id. 
§ 2257A(f).  First-time violators of § 2257 face a maximum 
sentence of five years’ incarceration, with subsequent 
violations punishable by imprisonment of “not more than 10 
years but not less than 2 years.”  Id. § 2257(i).  Sentences for 
violations of § 2257A are capped at one year, unless the 
violation involves an effort to conceal a substantive offense 
involving the use of a minor in sexually explicit depictions, in 
which case the sentencing range mirrors that imposed for 
violations of § 2257.  Id. § 2257A(i). 
II. 
 Plaintiffs are a collection of individuals, commercial 
entities, and interest groups who are engaged in or represent 
others involved in the production of images covered under the 
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Statutes.2  This case first came to us following the District 
Court’s grant of the Government’s motion to dismiss.  We 
held at that time that Plaintiffs stated viable as-applied and 
facial claims under both the First and Fourth Amendments.  
See FSC I, 677 F.3d at 535–46.  On remand, following a 
bench trial on Plaintiffs’ surviving claims, the District Court 
concluded that the Statutes and regulations passed 
constitutional muster with one exception:  Inspections without 
prior notice to examine records located in private residences 
                                                 
2 Specifically, these Plaintiffs are Free Speech Coalition, Inc., 
“a trade association representing more than 1,000 member 
businesses and individuals involved in the production and 
distribution of adult materials”; the American Society of 
Media Photographers, a trade association representing 
photographers; Thomas Hymes, “a journalist who operates a 
website related to the adult film industry”; Townsend 
Enterprises, Inc., doing business as the Sinclair Institute, “a 
producer and distributor of adult materials created for the 
purpose of educating adults about sexual health and 
fulfillment”; Carol Queen, “a sociologist, sexologist, and 
feminist sex educator”; Barbara Nitke, “a faculty member for 
the School of Visual Arts in New York City and a 
photographer”; Marie L. Levine, also known as Nina Hartley, 
a performer, sex educator, and producer of adult 
entertainment; Betty Dodson, “a sexologist, sex educator, 
author, and artist”; Carlin Ross, “who hosts a website with 
Dodson providing individuals ashamed of their genitalia with 
a forum for anonymously discussing and posting images of 
their genitalia”; and photographers Barbara Alper, David 
Steinberg, and Dave Levingston.  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 524 n.1. 
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violated the Fourth Amendment.  Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. 
Holder (FSC II), 957 F. Supp. 2d 564, 607–08 (E.D. Pa. 
2013).  But the District Court declined to issue an injunction 
and granted only declaratory relief.  Id. at 609. 
 In doing so, the District Court made several factual 
findings.  The District Court found credible Plaintiffs’ 
testimony that “it is their sincere belief that the use of 
sexually explicit material is a valued artistic endeavor and 
also serves valued educational motives.”  Id. at 583.  But each 
Plaintiff also “consistently use[d] young-looking performers 
and . . . almost all of their work had a commercial or profit 
motive.”  Id. at 584.  Indeed, no Plaintiff was “an exclusive 
producer of sexually explicit depictions of ‘clearly mature’ 
adults.”  Id.  Nor was there any “evidence that any Plaintiff 
produces purely noncommercial sexual depictions or 
maintains records for such depictions.”  Id. at 586. 
 Further, the District Court found that the Statutes made 
only two of Plaintiffs’ existing or intended works “practically 
impossible” to create.  Id. at 585.  The first is Plaintiffs Carlin 
Ross’s and Betty Dodson’s “genital art gallery” displaying 
anonymous submissions of individuals’ genitalia for the 
purpose of demonstrating that each person’s sexual anatomy 
is normal.  Id. at 574, 585.  Submissions decreased markedly 
when Dodson and Ross began to require identification in 
response to the Statutes.  The second is Plaintiff Barbara 
Alper’s documentary effort to photograph the adult, gay 
community on New York’s Fire Island engaging in 
anonymous sex.  Id. at 573, 585.  The inability of performers 
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lawfully to remain anonymous effectively defeats the purpose 
of that project.3 
 As to the general types of pornography publicly 
available, the District Court found that “[y]outhful-looking 
performers are ubiquitous in the adult entertainment 
industry.”  Id. at 584.  Testimony from Government expert 
Gail Dines demonstrated that “‘teen porn’4 accounts for 
approximately one-third of the material on pornography tube 
sites”—Internet portals that host a significant amount of free 
sexually explicit content.  Id. at 586.  Further, youthful-
looking performers appear not only in depictions categorized 
as “teen porn” but also other genres nominally involving 
older adults.  Id. at 584.  The District Court found Dines’s 
analysis to be more methodologically rigorous than that from 
any of Plaintiffs’ experts.  In particular, the District Court 
criticized Plaintiffs’ expert Daniel Linz’s reliance on “simple 
                                                 
3 We note that the performers would not need to show their 
identifications to one another.  Only Alper would need to see 
their identifications.  Thus, Alper could still photograph 
persons having anonymous sex, the only difference being that 
the performers would not be anonymous to her.  Of course, if 
law enforcement chose to inspect Alper’s records, it would 
also become privy to these performers’ identities. 
4 As discussed further, infra, Dines’s identification of “teen 
porn” involved searching specific pornographic websites for 
terms associated with youthful performers.  In general, “teen 
porn” is that category of pornography that depicts individuals 
who could be teenagers, although commercial producers of 
pornography contend that the models are not actually under 
18. 
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Google searches” to determine the scope of pornography 
publicly available.  Id. at 586. 
 The District Court also accorded “significant weight” 
to the testimony of Government expert Francis Biro.  Id. at 
586.  As Biro explained, “12, 13 and 14 year olds can appear 
to be much older than they are because they may experience 
early sexual and physical maturation,” thus demonstrating 
“the inability to determine chronological age from visual 
inspections.”  Id.  Indeed, “[e]ven maturation experts will 
have a 2–5 year margin of error when trying to ascertain the 
age of a young adult, . . . and that margin is greater for 
members of the public.”  Id. at 578. 
 By contrast, the District Court viewed Plaintiffs’ 
experts with skepticism.  Specifically, the District Court 
rejected testimony from Plaintiffs’ experts Michelle Drouin 
and Marc Zimmerman as to the prevalence of “sexting,” 
defined as “the sending of text messages containing sexually 
explicit depictions over cell phones and similar devices.”  Id. 
at 576, 587.  In particular, because Drouin’s and 
Zimmerman’s studies used convenience samples and 
respondent-driven sampling instead of random sampling, the 
District Court concluded that those analyses “were not worthy 
of weight.”5  Id. at 587.  Further, because their analyses did 
                                                 
5 A convenience sample involves surveying “members of the 
population that are easily accessible to you for whatever 
reason.”  App. 5992.  Respondent-driven sampling is a form 
of convenience sampling and involves incentivizing 
volunteers to recruit others to participate in the study.  App. 
5998. 
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not quantify the amount of sexting involving “images of 
intercourse, masturbation, or a ‘lascivious display’ of 
genitals” that would be covered under the Statutes, Drouin’s 
and Zimmerman’s testimony failed to demonstrate any 
overbreadth related to sexting.  Id. 
 Finally, the District Court also made findings 
regarding the searches conducted to ensure compliance with 
the Statutes.  Although 29 inspections had been conducted 
since 2006, “the inspections program at the FBI has been 
completely shut down” since early 2008 and no plans are in 
place to recommence searches.  Id. at 579–88.  But those 
inspections that were conducted “involved physical 
intrusions” into nonpublic spaces of both businesses and 
residences, including internal offices, supply rooms, kitchens, 
conference rooms, dining rooms, and garages.  Id. at 588.  
And despite the regulations’ express prohibition, “[a]dvance 
notice was given on several occasions,” without evidence that 
the integrity of any search was undermined.  Id. at 588–89.  
Indeed, even the testifying FBI agents “believed it would be 
very difficult if not impossible to fabricate the records 
required by the Statutes in a 24-hour period.”  Id. at 589. 
III. 
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We review legal questions de novo, including the 
constitutionality of the federal statutes and regulations at 
issue here.  ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 
2008).  The court’s factual findings following a bench trial 
are typically reviewed for clear error.  Post v. St. Paul 
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Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 514 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 
Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Corrpro Cos., 478 F.3d 
557, 566 (3d Cir. 2007)).  But “[i]n the First Amendment 
context, reviewing courts have a duty to engage in a 
searching, independent factual review of the full record” to 
the extent any factual findings are relevant to the First 
Amendment constitutional standard.  ACLU, 534 F.3d at 186 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Scarfo, 263 
F.3d 80, 91 (3d Cir. 2001)).  This independent review “is not 
equivalent to a ‘de novo’ review of the ultimate judgment 
itself” but is necessary to ensure “that the judgment does not 
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free 
expression.”  Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 
466 U.S. 485, 508, 514 n.31 (1984) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964)). 
IV. 
A. 
 We first consider Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge under 
the First Amendment.  In that regard, we have already 
determined that the Statutes are content neutral.  FSC I, 677 
F.3d at 533–35.  Accordingly, we apply intermediate scrutiny 
to evaluate the burdens imposed on Plaintiffs’ free-speech 
rights.  Id. at 535.  “A statute satisfies intermediate scrutiny 
where it:  (1) advances a ‘substantial’ governmental interest; 
(2) does not ‘burden substantially more speech than is 
necessary’ (i.e., the statute must be narrowly tailored); and (3) 
leaves open ‘ample alternative channels for communication.’”  
Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 
798–800 (1989)).   
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 In FSC I, we agreed with the District Court that two of 
these prongs were satisfied as a matter of law.  Specifically, 
we held that “the Statutes clearly advance a substantial 
governmental interest—protecting children from sexual 
exploitation by pornographers.”  Id.  They do so  
in at least four specific ways:  (1) they ensure 
that primary producers of sexually explicit 
expression confirm the ages of their performers 
prior to filming; (2) they permit secondary 
producers that publish the depictions to verify 
that the performers were not children; (3) they 
prevent children from passing themselves off as 
adults; and (4) they aid law enforcement and 
eliminate subjective disputes with producers 
over whether the producer should have verified 
the age of a particular performer.   
Id.  Further, “the Statutes leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication” given that “[t]he Statutes 
regulate recordkeeping and labeling procedures and do not 
ban or otherwise limit speech.”  Id. at 536 n.13.  In this 
appeal, we are left to determine whether the District Court 
properly concluded that the Government has met its burden to 
prove that the Statutes and their implementing regulations are 
narrowly tailored.  See Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 
183, 201 (3d Cir. 2008) (for as-applied First Amendment 
challenges, “[t]he burden is on the [government] to 
demonstrate the constitutionality of its actions”). 
 Narrow tailoring does not require that the regulation be 
“the least restrictive or least intrusive” means of achieving 
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“the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests.”  
Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.  Instead, “[n]arrow tailoring is 
satisfied where the statute at issue does not ‘burden 
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the 
government’s legitimate interests.’”  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 536 
(quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).  In this case, part of our 
inquiry thus involves comparing “the amount of Plaintiffs’ 
constitutionally-protected speech that does not implicate the 
government’s interest in protecting children” with “the 
amount of Plaintiffs’ speech that implicates the government’s 
interest.”  Id. at 537. 
 But we must be careful not to reduce our narrow-
tailoring inquiry under intermediate scrutiny to a rigid 
mathematical formula or purely quantitative assessment.  See 
Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(“Despite the seemingly mathematical character of the 
metaphor, the Supreme Court in fact applies [narrow 
tailoring] as a balancing test . . . .”).  Our analysis when 
applying intermediate scrutiny “always encompasses some 
balancing of the state interest and the means used to 
effectuate that interest,” and “varies to some extent from 
context to context, and case to case.”  Bartnicki v. Vopper, 
200 F.3d 109, 124 (3d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).  
In keeping with this view of the narrow-tailoring inquiry as a 
balancing test, we ask whether “a substantial portion of the 
burden on speech does not serve to advance [the 
government’s] goals.”  McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 
2535 (2014) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).  Indeed, 
“unless we know the extent to which the [regulations] in fact 
interfere with protected speech, we cannot say whether they 
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suppress ‘substantially more speech than . . . necessary.’”  
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 668 (1994) 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 
799); see also Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 129 (considering “the 
practical impact” of the regulation).  Thus, assessing the 
scope of the burden on speech looks not just to the quantity of 
speech burdened, but also to the qualitative nature of that 
burden.  And even if a significant amount of speech is 
burdened in a manner that is not strictly necessary to fulfill 
the Government’s stated interest, a regulation may in some 
circumstances still be sufficiently narrowly tailored if the 
nature of the actual burden imposed on that speech is 
minimal. 
 Our consideration here of the nature of the burden 
imposed in addition to the quantity of speech that a regulation 
burdens is not novel.  In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the 
Supreme Court considered whether a regulation requiring 
performers in a public bandshell to use city-provided sound 
equipment and technicians survived intermediate scrutiny.  
491 U.S. at 784.  Holding that the regulation was sufficiently 
narrowly tailored, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention 
that such a regulation “sweeps far more broadly than is 
necessary to further the city’s legitimate concern with sound 
volume.”  Id. at 801.  In doing so, the Court found the lack of 
a “substantial deleterious effect on the ability of bandshell 
performers to achieve the quality of sound they desired” to 
favor the conclusion that the regulation was narrowly tailored.  
Id. at 801–02.  Because the regulation did not function as a 
ban on speech, but instead “focuse[d] on the source of the 
evils the city s[ought] to eliminate . . . and eliminate[d] them 
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without at the same time banning or significantly restricting a 
substantial quantity of speech that does not create the same 
evils,” the regulation exemplified “the essence of narrow 
tailoring.”  Id. at 799 n.7. 
 Further, the nature of the Government’s interest and 
the extent to which that interest is advanced also factors into 
the narrow-tailoring calculus.  Whether a content-neutral 
regulation is narrowly tailored “does not turn on a judge’s 
agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the 
most appropriate method for promoting significant 
government interests or the degree to which those interests 
should be promoted.”  Id. at 799 (quoting United States v. 
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Indeed, the Government has “some 
discretion in deciding how best to achieve its legitimate 
purposes.”  Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 277 
(3d Cir. 2009).  Nevertheless, “[a] restriction cannot be 
‘narrowly tailored’ in the abstract; it must be tailored to the 
particular government interest asserted.”  McTernan v. City of 
York, Pa., 564 F.3d 636, 656 (3d Cir. 2009).  Thus, “[t]o meet 
the requirement of narrow tailoring, the government must 
demonstrate that alternative measures that burden 
substantially less speech would fail to achieve the 
government’s interests, not simply that the chosen route is 
easier.”  McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2540.  
B. 
 These principles not only guide our analysis of the 
merits of Plaintiffs’ as-applied First Amendment claim, but 
also impact the Government’s threshold challenge as to Free 
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Speech Coalition’s (FSC) and the American Society of Media 
Photographers’ (ASMP) associational standing to bring an as-
applied claim on behalf of the entire adult film industry.  
Associational standing requires that at least one of the 
organizational plaintiffs “demonstrate that ‘(a) its members 
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) 
the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the 
organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor 
the relief requested requires the participation of individual 
members in the lawsuit.’”  Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y v. Green 
Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 
333, 343 (1977)). 
 But neither FSC nor ASMP represents “the adult film 
industry” as a whole.  Instead, their members comprise 
various segments of that industry.  And those individual 
members’ participation is necessary to assess properly FSC’s 
and ASMP’s as-applied First Amendment claims.  
Specifically, we must examine whether the Statutes and 
regulations are sufficiently circumscribed as they apply to the 
specific conduct of FSC’s and ASMP’s members.  See Bd. of 
Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989) (a 
plaintiff alleging a statute is not narrowly tailored “asserts 
that the acts of his that are the subject of the litigation fall 
outside what a properly drawn prohibition could cover”).  
And as our description of the law governing narrow tailoring 
makes clear, whether the Statutes and regulations survive 
intermediate scrutiny as applied to each producer of sexually 
explicit images turns on the degree to which that individual 
producer’s speech is unnecessarily burdened.  Indeed, the 
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Statutes might be narrowly tailored as to some of FSC’s and 
ASMP’s members but not others depending upon the nature 
of each member’s speech.  Identifying those members for 
whom the Statutes may be unconstitutional thus requires an 
individualized inquiry that fails to satisfy the requirements for 
associational standing.  Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 
321 (1980) (individualized nature of a Free Exercise claim 
negated organizational standing); Bano v. Union Carbide 
Corp., 361 F.3d 696, 714 (2d Cir. 2004) (no organizational 
standing where “‘the fact and extent’ of the injury that gives 
rise to the claims for injunctive relief ‘would require 
individualized proof’” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 515–16 (1975))).6   
                                                 
6 We note that requests for prospective injunctive relief like 
that sought here typically “do not require participation by 
individual association members,” Hosp. Council of W. Pa. v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 949 F.2d 83, 89 (3d Cir. 1991), because 
such a blanket remedy “inure[s] to the benefit of those 
members of the association actually injured,” Warth, 422 U.S. 
at 515.  But even if the remedy does not require individual 
proof, “[c]ourts ‘also must examine the claims asserted to 
determine whether they require individual participation.’”  
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l., Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l 
Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 229 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Rent 
Stabilization Ass’n v. Dinkins, 5 F.3d 591, 596 (2d Cir. 
1993)), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).  Here, the need for 
extensive individual participation to assess how each 
member’s speech is impacted precludes associational 
standing despite the nature of the relief sought. 
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 To be sure, FSC’s members comprise individuals and 
businesses across many facets of the adult film industry, 
including those involved in the creation, distribution, and sale 
of both live and prerecorded sexually explicit materials.  
Some of those members, like Vivid Video, Wicked Pictures, 
K-Beech Video, and Darkside Productions, are large-scale 
producers of commercial pornography.  And ASMP 
represents some 400 photographers whose work involves 
sexually explicit images.  But even if FSC’s and ASMP’s 
members collectively produce a significant portion of the 
works generated by the adult film industry, aggregating that 
industry’s speech in toto is an improper method for 
identifying the burdens imposed on specific members.  
Generalized statements regarding the adult film industry’s 
speech cannot replace the individualized inquiry required, and 
FSC and ASMP lack associational standing to bring an as-
applied First Amendment claim on behalf of their members. 
C. 
 Our analysis of Plaintiffs’ as-applied First Amendment 
challenge is therefore limited to those Plaintiffs engaged in 
the actual production of images covered under the Statutes.  
We examine first the nature of the burden placed on these 
Plaintiffs.  That the Statutes’ requirements here do not operate 
as a ban on the speech in which Plaintiffs would engage 
weighs in favor of finding those regulations narrowly tailored.  
As the District Court found, only a very limited number of 
Plaintiffs’ works are seriously impacted.  Plaintiffs are still 
free in large measure to produce the very same speech that 
they would produce absent the Statutes’ recordkeeping 
requirements.  See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000) 
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(“[W]hen a content-neutral regulation does not entirely 
foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the 
tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive 
or least intrusive means of serving the statutory goal.”). 
 We acknowledge that compliance with the Statutes and 
regulations, as with any regulatory requirement, is more 
costly than if those requirements did not exist.  Plaintiffs must 
create and maintain, or contract with a third party to maintain, 
records pertaining to each performer depicted in a sexually 
explicit image.  And they must make those records available 
to law enforcement upon request.  But these requirements are 
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not so onerous as to become prohibitive.7  Indeed, as the 
District Court observed, even plaintiff Sinclair Institute, “the 
world’s largest producer[] and distributor[] of adult sexual 
                                                 
7 We recognize that some Plaintiffs testified to the belief that 
every unpublished image created during a photoshoot—which 
could amount to hundreds of prints—needed to be labeled 
individually to comply with the Statutes.  The District Court 
dismissed these concerns because “the regulations do not 
appear to require a label be affixed until a photograph is made 
publicly available.”  FSC II, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 591 n.15 
(citing 28 C.F.R. § 75.8(a)–(f)).  Whether that distinction is 
tenable, we note that for many works, the regulations do not 
require every image to be labeled.  For example, books, 
magazines, and periodicals need be labeled only “on the first 
page that appears after the front cover or on the page on 
which copyright information appears.”  28 C.F.R. § 75.8(a).  
And “a digital video disc (DVD) containing multiple 
depictions is a single matter for which the statement may be 
located in a single place covering all depictions on the DVD.”  
Id. § 75.8(e).  To the extent unpublished images do not fall 
under any of the express categories in the regulations, “the 
statement is to be prominently displayed consistent with the 
manner of display required for the aforementioned 
categories.”  Id. § 75.8(f).  Therefore, it seems the regulations 
would require only a single label for a compilation of 
unpublished images from a photoshoot, consistent with the 
requirement for books, magazines, and DVDs.  We need not 
resolve this dispute, however, because even if such labels 
must be affixed to every print in a photoshoot, we would still 
find the Statutes and regulations to be narrowly tailored.   
 24 
 
education and health media,” spends only $75,000 per year to 
comply with the Statutes despite generating millions in 
revenue from the production of sexually explicit images.  See 
FSC II, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 575 (alterations in original).  And 
several of the individual plaintiffs, including David Steinberg 
who maintains the required records in his home office and 
Marie Levine who maintains records through a third-party 
custodian, have not found compliance with the Statutes to be 
financially prohibitive.  That the burden imposed on Plaintiffs 
here is relatively minimal supports the conclusion that the 
Statutes are narrowly tailored.  See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 n.7.  
 Some Plaintiffs testified that they modified their works 
in response to the Statutes’ requirements, while others 
produce fewer or different images than they would have if the 
Statutes did not exist.  For example, journalist Thomas 
Hymes refuses to upload certain images to his website to 
avoid running afoul of the Statutes.  Photographer Dave 
Levingston avoids publishing certain images that he deems 
could be interpreted as depicting a simulated sexual act and 
no longer photographs models in such poses.  And the burden 
of collecting identification records for all performers has 
discouraged additional Plaintiffs from producing still other 
works, along with discouraging some potential adult 
performers from appearing in sexual depictions.  But the fact 
that some Plaintiffs are avoiding publishing certain images is 
not directly attributable to the Statutes and regulations 
themselves and is not equivalent to a governmental ban.  We 
are cognizant that “courts must be wary that taxes, regulatory 
laws, and other laws that impose financial burdens are not 
used to undermine . . . freedom of speech.”  Pitt News v. 
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Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 110 (3d Cir. 2004).  But in light of 
several Plaintiffs’ compliance with the Statutes without 
incident or prohibitive financial burdens, Levingston’s and 
Hymes’s choices to forego publication of certain images 
amount to nothing more than personal decisions to avoid 
costs that they could otherwise bear.  Cf. id. (“A business in 
the communications field cannot escape its obligation to 
comply with generally applicable laws on the ground that the 
cost of compliance would be prohibitive.”).  On balance, this 
evidence does not demonstrate that the Statutes’ objective 
burdens for the purpose of a narrow-tailoring analysis are any 
greater than we have already discussed. 
D. 
 Having considered the nature of the burden imposed 
on Plaintiffs, we turn next to the amount of each Plaintiffs’ 
speech needlessly impacted.  Here, the Government’s interest 
in enforcing the Statutes is to prevent producers of sexually 
explicit materials from depicting minor performers, either 
purposefully or inadvertently.  Achieving this interest 
becomes particularly complicated given the difficulty of 
discerning a potential performer’s age by sight alone.  But as 
we stated when this case first came to us, burdening “speech 
involving performers who are obviously adults” does not 
advance the Government’s interest in protecting children.  
FSC I, 677 F.3d at 537.  Requiring identification and 
recordkeeping for clearly mature performers does nothing to 
prevent children from appearing in sexually explicit materials 
because, by definition, a minor could not be mistaken for a 
clearly mature adult. 
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 The Government takes the position that the evidence 
produced at trial demonstrates that any attempt to identify a 
class of clearly mature adults exempt from the Statutes’ reach 
would undermine the Statutes’ effectiveness.  In the 
Government’s view, reliably identifying a performer as 
clearly mature by sight is a fruitless endeavor given the 
different rates at which individuals visibly mature along with 
minors’ ability to appear older through makeup and other 
artificial means.  Thus, the argument goes, anything less than 
a uniform identification requirement would leave children at 
risk.  In support of this argument, the Government’s pubertal 
maturation expert, Francis Biro, testified that “the average 
person, without training and experience in maturation 
assessment” would “have difficulty in determining someone’s 
age by visual inspection.”  App. 5467–68.   
 But Biro also testified that it is “generally true[,] [b]ut 
not always true” that adults who are 25 years of age or older 
will not be mistaken for minors under age 18.  App. 5492–
5493.  And “the vast majority” of adults 30 years of age or 
older could not be mistaken for a minor.  App. 5493.  Further, 
Biro conceded that one could not confuse a 60-year-old for a 
minor.  App. 5491.  These observations support our 
previously stated view that the Statutes’ application to 
producers of only “an illustrated sex manual for the 
elderly”—but who did not employ youthful-looking 
performers—may be unconstitutional.  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 537 
(quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 90 (D.C. Cir. 
1994)).  Thus, we reject the Government’s contention that age 
verification for all performers regardless of their actual age 
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always furthers the Government’s interest in preventing the 
sexual exploitation of minors. 
 While a universal recordkeeping requirement would be 
easier for the Government to enforce, ease of enforcement is 
not the touchstone for narrow tailoring.  In McCullen v. 
Coakley, the Supreme Court considered whether a law 
proscribing “knowingly stand[ing] on a ‘public way or 
sidewalk’ within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to any 
place, other than a hospital, where abortions are performed” 
survived intermediate scrutiny.  134 S. Ct. at 2525 (quoting 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266 § 120E1/2(a), (b)).  In holding that 
this law was not narrowly tailored, the Court observed that 
“[a] painted line on the sidewalk is easy to enforce, but the 
prime objective of the First Amendment is not efficiency.”  
Id. at 2540.  Instead, “[t]o meet the requirement of narrow 
tailoring, the government must demonstrate that alternative 
measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to 
achieve the government’s interests, not simply that the chosen 
route is easier.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
 Here, given that the Government’s own expert testified 
that at a certain advanced age, no individual could be 
mistaken for a minor, the Government has not established that 
imposing some age cutoff would necessarily undermine the 
Statutes’ effectiveness in preventing the exploitation of 
children.  Preventing all erroneous age determinations does 
not advance the Government’s interest in combatting child 
pornography where even an error would not run the risk that a 
minor would appear in sexually explicit materials.  For 
instance, where an individual appears 60 years old, no one 
could mistake that same individual for a minor under 18.  
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Mistakes could be made about that person’s specific age, but 
not his/her minor status.  Requiring age-verification records 
for an apparent 60-year old is therefore a burden that does 
nothing to protect children.  Thus, the difficulties in 
accurately calculating age by sight alone justifies some of the 
Statutes’ prophylactic reach, but the Statutes’ burdens do not 
advance the Government’s interest when imposed on 
performers whom no reasonable person could mistake for a 
minor.   
 This observation does not mean, however, that the 
Statutes are not narrowly tailored as applied to these 
Plaintiffs.  Indeed, time and again we have stated that under 
intermediate scrutiny, the Government need not employ the 
least restrictive or least intrusive means.  See, e.g., King v. 
Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 239 (3d Cir. 2014); FSC I, 
677 F.3d at 535; McTernan, 564 F.3d at 655.  “So long as the 
means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to 
achieve the government’s interest, . . . the regulation will not 
be invalid simply because a court concludes that the 
government’s interest could be adequately served by some 
less-speech-restrictive alternative.”  Ward, 491 U.S. at 800 
(emphasis added).  And in this case, “[t]he Government must 
be allowed to paint with a reasonably broad brush if it is to 
cover depictions of all performers who might conceivably 
have been minors at the time they were photographed or 
videotaped.”  Am. Library Ass’n, 33 F.3d at 90.   
 But neither side successfully established at trial where 
the line between “clearly mature” and “possibly underage” 
can effectively be drawn.  Plaintiffs, relying on Biro’s 
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testimony,8 observe that most minors would not be mistaken 
for someone over the age of 25.  Using that cutoff, Plaintiffs 
urge that requiring identification for anyone who appears over 
25 imposes burdens that do not advance the Government’s 
interests.  But Biro’s statement that generally most minors 
could not be mistaken for a 25-year-old adult does not 
establish that the Government’s interests are not furthered by 
requiring identification for performers over age 25.  To the 
contrary, Biro’s testimony establishes that the rare minor 
could appear up to 30 years old.9  Failing to require producers 
to check identification for such individuals would therefore 
render the Statutes less effective in preventing child 
pornography.  Thus, at the very least, comparing the use of 
performers above and below age 25 as Plaintiffs urge does 
                                                 
8 Plaintiffs did not offer their own expert on pubertal 
maturation, and do not otherwise challenge Biro’s testimony 
regarding visual determinations of age.  Further, the District 
Court found Biro’s testimony on these topics to be credible.  
FSC II, 957 F. Supp. at 586.  After conducting an independent 
review of that testimony, we see no reason to reject Biro’s 
findings. 
9 We express no view as to whether minors in fact could 
appear to be over 30 years old, particularly given the 
possibility of makeup and other artificial enhancements.  
Indeed, Biro himself equivocated on this point.  However, we 
need not address whether the Government in a different case 
and on a different record can prove that requiring 
identification even for performers who appear over 30 helps 
protect children. 
 30 
 
not advance their argument that the Statutes are not narrowly 
tailored. 
 At all events, we need not identify the precise age at 
which no minor could reasonably be mistaken for an adult of 
that age to conduct a narrowing-tailoring analysis.  Given that 
it is the Government’s burden to prove that the Statutes are 
narrowly tailored, we can instead look to which burdens the 
Government has established in fact advance the goal of 
preventing the sexual exploitation of minors.  As noted above, 
Biro’s testimony supports a finding that requiring 
identification for performers up to age 30 implicates the 
Government’s interest in protecting children.  Yet even if we 
accept that the Government proved no more than that and that 
requiring recordkeeping for individuals 30 and older does not 
advance the Government’s interest, the evidence indeed 
demonstrates that a significant proportion of Plaintiffs’ work 
falls squarely within the Statutes’ permissible scope. 
 Specifically, of the models employed by Dodson and 
Ross, 45% of them are under 30 years of age.  Levine’s 
under-30 models account for 40.3%.  Similarly, 47.37% of 
Nitke’s models are under 30.  Levingston’s number 60%.  
And 33.97% of the Sinclair Institute’s models were under 30.  
Finally, based on self-reported figures, 24% of Steinberg’s 
models were under 30 while the “vast majority” of 
participants in Carol Queen’s live-streamed masturbation 
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fundraiser were in their 30s and 40s along with “10 to 12 
percent” under age 25.  App. 5973.10   
 Undoubtedly, these figures demonstrate that the 
number of performers to whom the Statutes apply, yet for 
whom requiring identification does not protect children, is not 
insignificant.  But equally clear is that each Plaintiff’s work 
depicts a substantial number of individuals for whom 
requiring identification does promote the Government’s 
interests.  And as noted previously, the qualitative burdens 
imposed on Plaintiffs are not so great that any works beyond 
one project of Dodson’s and Ross’s and one of Alper’s are 
                                                 
10 The record does not reflect any age breakdowns for models 
utilized by Barbara Alper, but the burdens she identified 
centered upon her inability to permit her subjects to remain 
anonymous.  Alper assures us that each of her subjects would 
be an adult, but not that they would be clearly mature.  Nor 
does the record otherwise reflect what proportion of her 
photographic efforts would have been limited to clearly 
mature adults.  Therefore, we are unable to identify which 
burdens advance the Government’s interests with respect to 
her desired speech and which do not.  Suffice it to say, 
however, that the Government’s interest in ensuring that 
minors are not sexually exploited is advanced when 
completely anonymous sexual participants whom we have no 
reason to believe are over 18 must verify their ages before 
appearing in sexually explicit materials. 
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seriously impacted.11  Thus, although some Plaintiffs use 
smaller numbers of under-30 performers, the minimal 
qualitative burdens of storing identification records imposed 
on even these Plaintiffs still supports a finding that the 
Statutes are narrowly tailored. 
 Another crucial point here is that Plaintiffs do not face 
a substantial additional burden attributable to keeping records 
for clearly mature performers on top of the records they must 
maintain for young performers.  Instead, most of the burden 
Plaintiffs face under the Statutes is due to the procedures they 
must put in place to store, organize, and make available 
records for performers generally.  These startup costs 
associated with creating a recordkeeping system under the 
Statutes, including the costs of creating indexes, advance the 
Government’s interests in preventing the sexual exploitation 
of children.  Collecting additional identification for the 
clearly mature performers that each Plaintiff also employs 
and inserting them into this system does not impose a 
significant additional burden.  For example, Plaintiffs are not 
required to create a separate electronic database for clearly 
mature adults.  Instead, any clearly mature performers would 
be just one more data point in a preexisting recordkeeping 
                                                 
11 Moreover, projects like these illustrate precisely why 
Congress enacted the Statutes.  Regarding Dodson’s and 
Ross’s project, it is especially difficult to discern whether a 
person is a minor based on an isolated picture of that person’s 
genitals.  And as noted above, we have no reason to conclude 
that Alper’s subjects would clearly be mature.  The difficulty 
in distinguishing minors from adults that justifies the 
Statutes’ reach thus pervades both of these projects. 
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scheme.  Thus, the additional burdens arising from collecting 
identification from clearly mature adults does not establish 
that a “substantial portion of the burden on speech does not 
serve to advance [the Government’s] goals.”  McCullen, 134 
S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).  To the 
contrary, most of the burden Plaintiffs incur through 
compliance with the Statutes is implicated by the 
Government’s interest in protecting children.   
 Accordingly, because Plaintiffs each employ a 
substantial number of youthful-looking models, the 
qualitative burden to comply with the Statutes is minimal and 
prohibits none of their speech, and because most of the 
burden Plaintiffs face in establishing an identification and 
recordkeeping system accessible by law enforcement 
advances the Government’s interest in combatting child 
pornography, we hold that the Statutes and regulations, with 
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one possible exception,12 are narrowly tailored as applied to 
Plaintiffs. 
                                                 
12 As discussed infra, we also hold that 28 C.F.R. § 75.5 as 
applied to Plaintiffs violates the Fourth Amendment insofar 
as it authorizes warrantless searches.  This holding raises 
doubt about the constitutionality under the First Amendment 
of § 75.5’s command that producers also make their records 
available for at least twenty hours per week during pre-
established periods.  See id. § 75.5(c)(1).  Specifically, we 
question whether this requirement is narrowly tailored as 
applied to Plaintiffs given that a warrant will allow the police 
to obtain the records regardless of a producer’s or third-party 
custodian’s specific availability to permit execution of the 
warrant.  To require Plaintiffs, many of whom are niche 
participants in the adult entertainment industry, to incur the 
additional burden of contracting with a third party or 
remaining on standby themselves for twenty hours per week 
so that the Government may execute a warrant at preordained 
times seems to do little to advance the Government’s interest 
in protecting children.   
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 As a final point on this topic, we note that we do not 
have in this case any producer of sexually explicit images that 
exclusively employs clearly mature adults, however defined.  
No Plaintiff therefore meets the prototypical example we 
identified of an individual who produces an “illustrated sex 
manual for the elderly.”  Nor do any of the plaintiffs in this 
litigation produce only images intended for private use rather 
than public distribution.  See Connection Distrib. Co. v. 
Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 337–38 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(assuming but not deciding that application of the law to “a 
couple who produced, but never distributed, a home video or 
photograph of themselves engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct” would be unconstitutional).  Whether the Statutes 
and regulations may be constitutionally applied to individuals 
                                                                                                             
Nor did the Government argue that the twenty-hour 
requirement itself helped protect children.  Instead, the 
Government conceded that the records at issue here could not 
be fabricated on short notice.  And the Government’s 
experience that conducting searches after providing notice did 
not undermine its inspection efforts under the Statutes further 
bolsters the conclusion that any legitimate purpose that the 
twenty-hour requirement might serve is attenuated.  But 
because the parties focused upon the amount of Plaintiffs’ 
speech that is burdened rather than on the specific burden that 
the twenty-hour requirement imposes relative to the 
Government’s legitimate interests, we think the prudent 
course is for us to remand to the District Court for further 
consideration of § 75.5(c)(1)’s First Amendment implications 
in light of our resolution of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment 
claim. 
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falling in either of those categories are therefore questions we 
need not reach. 
V. 
 We turn next to Plaintiffs’ claim under the First 
Amendment that the Statutes are facially overbroad.  This 
facial challenge requires consideration of four factors:  “(1) 
‘the number of valid applications’ of the statute; (2) ‘the 
historic or likely frequency of conceivably impermissible 
applications’; (3) ‘the nature of the activity or conduct sought 
to be regulated’; and (4) ‘the nature of the state interest 
underlying the regulation.’”  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 537–38 
(quoting Gibson v. Mayor & Council of Wilmington, 355 F.3d 
215, 226 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Demonstrating a single 
impermissible application will not invalidate a law on its face.  
“Instead, a law may be invalidated as overbroad only if ‘a 
substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, 
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’”  
Id. at 537 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)).  Unlike an 
as-applied challenge, the burden falls upon Plaintiffs to 
demonstrate the Statutes’ facial overbreadth.  Virginia v. 
Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 (2003). 
 Evidence demonstrating that the conceivably 
impermissible applications of a statute are in reality 
widespread is probative of overbreadth.  Such evidence 
assists the court in not “go[ing] beyond the statute’s facial 
requirements and speculat[ing] about ‘hypothetical’ or 
‘imaginary’ cases.”  Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449–50.  
Indeed, “particularly where conduct and not merely speech is 
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involved, . . . the overbreadth of a statute must not only be 
real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s 
plainly legitimate sweep.”  Hill, 530 U.S. at 732 (quoting 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Members of City Council 
of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984) 
(“[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some 
impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to 
render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.”); Gibson, 
355 F.3d at 226 (discounting certain hypothetical scenarios as 
“more than slightly unrealistic”).   
 But although we must consider the relative quantities 
of valid and invalid applications of the Statutes, here too we 
must be careful not to reduce the facial overbreadth analysis 
to a mathematical calculation or numerical comparison.  See 
Aiello v. City of Wilmington, Del., 623 F.2d 845, 854 (3d Cir. 
1980) (“The question is a matter of degree; it will never be 
possible to say that a ratio of one invalid to nine valid 
applications makes a law substantially overbroad . . . .” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22, 
30 (1st Cir. 1977))).  Instead, determining whether a statute is 
facially unconstitutional requires “as much in the way of 
judgment” as it does “a comparison between the 
constitutional and unconstitutional applications of a law.”  
Connection Distrib. Co., 557 F.3d at 340.  Thus, 
“[s]ubstantial overbreadth involves not just an inquiry into the 
legitimate and illegitimate sweep of a statute; it also involves 
an inquiry into the ‘absolute’ nature of a law’s suppression of 
speech.”  Id.  It is not as simple as “placing . . . the number of 
overall applications of the statute in the denominator and the 
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number of unconstitutional applications of the statute in the 
numerator.”  Id. 
A. 
 We first compare “the amount of speech that 
implicates the government’s interest in protecting children” 
with “the amount of speech that is burdened but does not 
further the government’s interest” in an effort to “weigh the 
legitimate versus problematic applications of the Statutes.”  
FSC I, 677 F.3d at 538.  To do so requires identifying the 
Statutes’ full scope.  United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 
293 (2008) (“[I]t is impossible to determine whether a statute 
reaches too far without first knowing what the statute 
covers.”).  We previously rejected the Government’s 
proposed limiting construction confining the Statutes’ 
application to commercial images “intended for sale or trade.”  
FSC I, 677 F.3d at 538.  Instead, the Statutes’ plain text 
“makes clear that they apply broadly to all producers of actual 
or simulated sexually explicit depictions regardless of 
whether those depictions were created for the purpose of sale 
or trade.”  Id. at 539.  Accordingly, the Statutes reach 
essentially the entire universe of sexually explicit images, 
“including private, noncommercial depictions created and 
viewed by adults in their homes.”  Id. at 538. 
Yet although the Statutes’ reach is expansive, the valid 
applications of the Statutes are also plentiful.  According to 
Gail Dines, the Government’s expert on this topic, the top 
three pornographic Internet websites contain 17.97 million 
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pages containing words13 clearly related to young adults.  
This figure amounts to 34.2% of all pages within these 
pornographic sites.  We do not suggest that Dines’s use of 
Internet searches of specific websites is a precise barometer 
of the universe of pornography depicting youthful-looking 
adults publicly available.  Indeed, they do not account for the 
amount of sexually explicit materials featuring young adults 
available in print or other offline media.  But by limiting her 
searches to websites hosting pornographic material, her 
results are a reflection of the massive amount of pornographic 
material depicting youthful-looking performers available on 
those websites.  And those results support the proposition that 
the legitimate sweep of the Statutes is vast. 
Further, identifying the amount of pornography 
featuring youthful-looking performers by focusing only upon 
the labels attached to pornographic images is underinclusive 
of the amount of pornography for which requiring 
identification and recordkeeping advances the Government’s 
interests.  Youthful-looking performers appear across 
pornographic genres regardless of whether the material is 
expressly categorized as featuring young adults.  Even 
materials labeled as featuring mature adults often feature a 
young performer engaging in sexual intercourse with an older 
person.  And after examining all 61 categories of 
pornographic material on a top pornographic website—at the 
time, the 40th most visited website in the United States—
Dines found that the “overriding image is of a youthful 
looking woman.”  App. 5517.  So even Dines’s 17.97 million-
                                                 
13 Dines’s search terms were “teen,” “young,” “college,” and 
“daughter.”  App. 5016. 
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page estimate does not represent the full swath of sexually 
explicit materials to which the Statutes validly apply. 
Given the sizeable quantity of the Statutes’ valid 
applications, Plaintiffs face a difficult task to show that the 
Statutes are substantially overbroad.  Regarding depictions of 
clearly mature adults, Plaintiffs’ evidence of their own works, 
along with examples from other producers in the record, 
supports the proposition that there exists at least some non-
negligible quantum of these kinds of images.  But Plaintiffs 
fail in their attempts to demonstrate that the universe of 
sexually explicit images depicting only clearly mature adults 
outnumbers images depicting youthful-looking performers.  
To that end, Daniel Linz, one of Plaintiffs’ experts, conducted 
several Internet searches using Google.  He found just 28 
million hits for “teen pron [sic]” using simple Google 
searches, compared with 1.36 billion hits for “porn” alone.  
App. 5894.  Linz testified that he used the term “teen pron” 
instead of “teen porn” because, in his words, “Google is very 
sensitive about the possibility of typing in the term child porn, 
so this is used as a surrogate to allow for the widest possible 
search.”  App. 5884.  When searching for “teen porn” 
properly spelled, his results came out to 136 million hits. 
But Linz offers no reason for us to accept these 
searches as an accurate representation of the amount of 
pornography available on the Internet that depicts apparent 
teenagers.  This is especially problematic for Plaintiffs given 
that it is their burden, not the Government’s, to prove the 
Statutes’ overbreadth.  Indeed, we are skeptical that Linz’s 
comparisons between Google results for terms like “teen 
porn” and results for “porn” in any way reflect the amount of 
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pornography in those genres given that neither of these 
searches account for the fact that many of these search results 
will not contain pornographic images at all.  For example, 
news items or other written work regarding pornography from 
websites that do not host pornographic materials would be 
included in Linz’s results.  Further, no party presented data on 
the pornography available on peer-to-peer networks or other 
networks that Google does not catalog.  Nor does the record 
reflect how Google might filter search results containing 
pornography depicting youthful adults, a concern that 
motivated Linz to search the term “teen pron” instead of “teen 
porn” in the first place.  These flaws significantly undermine 
the reliability of Linz’s analysis.   
Further, the Government presents evidence that their 
own Internet-wide Google searches for “teen porn” 
(accurately spelled) and “porn” reflect 235 million and 818 
million hits, respectively.  App. 5018–20.  This is an 
enormous discrepancy with Linz’s results.  And as Dines 
pointed out, youthful adults appear in all categories of 
pornography, not just “teen porn,” making the attempt to 
estimate the amount of sexually explicit depictions of 
youthful adults using categorical search terms particularly 
foolhardy.  For these reasons, we agree with the District 
Court that Linz’s web searches do nothing to prove the 
Statutes’ potential overbreadth. 
We next consider Plaintiffs’ evidence of the 
prevalence of sexually explicit images created for private use, 
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as opposed to for sale or trade.14  Such images, because of 
their private nature, are difficult to quantify.  Nevertheless, 
one of Plaintiffs’ experts on these topics, Michelle Drouin,15 
established that there may be a significant number of private 
sexually explicit images shared between young adults.  
Drouin’s work, based on self-selected samples of university 
students, found that 54% of students in committed 
relationships had sent “sexually explicit pictures or videos” to 
their partners.  App. 973, 5600.  What qualified as “sexually 
explicit” was left undefined, and it is not clear how many of 
                                                 
14 The Government does not argue that burdening producers 
of such images advances its legitimate interests in preventing 
child pornography.  But we note that simply because an 
image was originally intended to be private does not 
necessarily mean that it will remain so, or that one of the 
participants in the sexually explicit image might not have a 
change of heart and make the image available for sale or 
trade.  However, whether these possibilities mean that the 
Government has a legitimate interest in requiring 
recordkeeping and labeling for even private images is not an 
issue we need address. 
15 Marc Zimmermann also testified on behalf of Plaintiffs, but 
his work was less probative.  His study asked whether 
participants had ever “sent a sexually suggestive nude or 
nearly nude photo or video of themselves to someone else.”  
App. 999, 6102.  Because of this conflation of images 
covered and not covered by the Statutes, Zimmermann’s work 
provides little indication of the quantity of invalid 
applications of the Statutes to private sexually explicit 
images. 
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these images would have fallen within the Statutes’ scope.  
Drouin’s second study was more specific, however, and 
found that approximately 20% of students in committed or 
casual sexual relationships had sent “an entirely nude picture 
or video”16 to their partners, and 10% of students in 
committed or cheating relationships had sent a picture or 
video of themselves masturbating.  App. 980.  A minimal 
number of cheating and casual sex partners also shared 
private images of sexual intercourse with another person.  Id.   
Drouin’s studies do not purport to be “representative 
of all American young adults.”  App. 981.  Indeed, by 
focusing on self-selected university students and their sharing 
habits, these studies represent only a narrow sliver of the 
potential universe of private sexual imagery created by 
consenting adults.  Nevertheless, although these statistics do 
not provide a precise picture of just how much private sexual 
imagery is produced in the United States, they are still 
informative.  They demonstrate that there is some substantial 
amount of private sexually explicit images that the Statutes 
burden unnecessarily.  Plaintiffs’ evidence of the use of 
                                                 
16 The Government rejects the “entirely nude” statistic 
because that category could include images of breasts but not 
genitalia.  Although an imperfect measure, this category is 
still probative of the amount of private images burdened by 
the Statutes even if it does not provide an exact estimate. 
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Internet communication services for similar purposes also 
buttresses this finding.17 
Accordingly, we agree with Plaintiffs that they have 
demonstrated the existence of a universe of private sexually 
explicit images not intended for sale or trade along with, to a 
limited degree, a universe of sexually explicit images that 
depict only clearly mature adults.  The precise size of these 
groupings defy easy calculation for the reasons we noted 
above, but statistical precision has never been required to 
establish a facial overbreadth claim.  For example, in 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. 
Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), the Supreme Court 
struck down as facially overbroad an ordinance making it a 
misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without a 
permit.  In doing so, the Court referenced the “significant 
amount of spontaneous speech” and the “significant number 
of persons who support causes anonymously” that the 
ordinance impacted, but did not suggest that the number of 
persons engaging in such speech needed to be calculated 
                                                 
17 Plaintiffs also relied on images posted on adult dating and 
social networking sites to prove the substantiality of private 
sexually explicit images.  Because these images are publicly 
available, however, we doubt that the Government’s interest 
is not advanced by application of the Statutes to these images.  
Similarly, we see no difference between a sexually explicit 
image produced for artistic, educational, or journalistic 
purposes and an image produced for more expressly 
pornographic purposes with respect to whether recordkeeping 
and identification helps to prevent the exploitation of children 
during the production of those images. 
 45 
 
precisely.  Id. at 166–67.  Requiring exact calculations would 
convert the overbreadth analysis into a mere numbers game, a 
proposition we have long rejected.  See Aiello, 623 F.2d at 
854 (“Merely balancing the number of permissible 
applications obviously is not sufficient.”).  Here, Plaintiffs 
have proved not only that the problematic applications of the 
Statute are neither hypothetical nor imaginary, but also that 
they are not isolated in scope. 
Further, we do not agree with the District Court that 
the difficulty of enforcing the Statutes against purely private 
producers of sexually explicit images counsels in favor of 
facial validity.  In that regard, the District Court cited 
approvingly law enforcement’s testimony that the 
Government “has no interest in enforcing the Statutes as to 
purely private communications and that it would have no 
conceivable way of even doing this—because it would have 
no knowledge of those private communications in the first 
place.”  FSC II, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 599–600.  As a factual 
matter, the District Court erred when it accepted that the 
Government would never be able to enforce the Statutes 
against private producers.  Even if the Government could not 
target such communications, it is no stretch of the 
imagination for the Government to become aware of such 
images inadvertently or through the investigation of other 
suspected crimes. 
More fundamentally, as the Supreme Court stated in 
United States v. Stevens, “the First Amendment protects 
against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of 
noblesse oblige.”  559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010).  If the Statutes’ 
burdens required us to deem them facially invalid, we would 
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not instead uphold them “merely because the Government 
promised to use [the Statutes] responsibly.”  Id.  Although the 
Government claims it would exercise its prosecutorial 
discretion appropriately today, those assurances “may one 
day be modified by the executive branch to permit the 
exercise of the Statutes’ full authority.”  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 
539 n.15.  Accordingly, “a promise by the government that it 
will interpret statutory language in a narrow, constitutional 
manner cannot, without more, save a potentially 
unconstitutionally overbroad statute.”  Id. 
Nevertheless, the invalid applications of the Statutes 
that Plaintiffs have demonstrated still pale in comparison with 
the Statutes’ legitimate applications, which counsels against 
holding the Statutes facially invalid.  Indeed, “[d]eclaring a 
statute unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds is ‘strong 
medicine’ and should be used ‘sparingly and only as a last 
resort.’”  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 537 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. 
at 613).  Facial invalidation thus “require[s] that a statute’s 
overbreadth be substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but 
also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”  
Williams, 553 U.S. at 292.  This is so because the invalidation 
of a law that in some of its applications is perfectly 
constitutional “has obviously harmful effects.”  Id.  
Accordingly, in some circumstances, “the chilling effect of an 
overbroad law, significant though it may be, cannot justify 
prohibiting all enforcement of that law—particularly a law 
that reflects ‘legitimate state interests in maintaining 
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally 
unprotected conduct.’”  Virginia, 539 U.S. at 119 (quoting 
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615).   
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Such is the case here.  Plaintiffs have failed to prove 
that the invalid applications of the Statutes are substantial 
relative to the Statutes’ legitimate scope.  The Sixth Circuit’s 
resolution of a similar challenge to the Statutes in Connection 
Distributing Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321 (6th Cir. 2009) (en 
banc), is instructive.  There the Sixth Circuit found that “the 
overwhelming majority of applications of § 2257 do not 
offend the free-speech guarantees of the Constitution, and a 
‘vigorous’ enforcement of the ‘substantial overbreadth’ 
requirement prohibits a party from leveraging a few alleged 
unconstitutional applications of the statute into a ruling 
invalidating the law in all of its applications.”  Id. at 340.  So 
too here.  Plaintiffs present more evidence of impermissible 
applications of the Statutes in this case than the Sixth Circuit 
confronted in Connection, but still not enough to deem the 
Statutes facially overbroad.  Given that it is Plaintiffs’ burden 
to demonstrate substantial overbreadth “from the text of [the 
law] and from actual fact,” Virginia, 539 U.S. at 122 
(alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City 
of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988)), their First Amendment facial 
claim fails.18 
                                                 
18 Amici the American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania 
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation argue that 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), requires us to 
consider whether it would have been difficult for Congress 
legislatively to exempt the invalid applications of the law that 
we have identified.  Surely if Congress could not have 
achieved a constitutional purpose through any other means, 
its efforts would be narrowly tailored.  But McCutcheon does 
not stand for the proposition that the existence of a legislative 
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B. 
Consideration of the remaining overbreadth factors—
“the nature of the activity or conduct sought to be regulated” 
and “the nature of the state interest underlying the 
regulation,” FSC I, 677 F.3d at 538 (quoting Gibson, 355 
F.3d at 226)—is also central to this conclusion.  The nature of 
the state interest underlying the Statutes—protecting children 
from sexual exploitation by pornographers—is compelling.  
“Child pornography harms and debases the most defenseless 
of our citizens.”  Williams, 553 U.S. at 307.  “The sexual 
abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant 
to the moral instincts of a decent people.”  Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002).  Indeed, “[i]t is 
                                                                                                             
alternative that would be less burdensome on speech means 
Congress is constitutionally required to choose that 
alternative.  Indeed, as the Supreme Court observed,  
 
when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny, 
we still require ‘a fit that is not necessarily 
perfect, but reasonable; that represents not 
necessarily the single best disposition but one 
whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest 
served,’ . . . that employs not necessarily the 
least restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly 
tailored to achieve the desired objective. 
 
Id. at 1456–57 (alterations in original) (quoting Bd. of Trs. of 
State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).  
Amici’s position is simply a least restrictive means test by 
another name that is inapplicable under intermediate scrutiny. 
 49 
 
evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest 
in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of 
a minor’ is ‘compelling.’”  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
756–57 (1982) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).  Thus, few objectives are 
on par with the “surpassing importance” of the Government’s 
compelling interest in this case.  Id. at 757. 
Further, the Statutes here represent an effort to quash 
child pornography after Congress found that direct 
prohibitions of child pornography had not solved the problem.  
The Statutes were passed only after Congressional findings 
“that an extensive interstate market for child pornography 
continued to exist and that children were still at risk for 
sexual exploitation by pornographers.”  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 
535.  The financial benefits accruing to producers from using 
youthful models as well as the financial benefits those models 
themselves enjoy, together with the difficulty of 
differentiating youthful adults from minors, all combine to 
increase the risks of children being exploited.  That the 
Statutes represent an effort to stem the tide of child 
pornography only after direct prohibitions have been 
insufficiently effective supports the Statutes’ facial validity. 
This is not to ignore Plaintiffs’ concerns that much of 
their expressive conduct is legitimate and protected under the 
First Amendment.  We fully recognize that certain explicit, 
non-obscene materials have artistic, educational, or other 
social value.  Our resolution of Plaintiffs’ facial challenge is 
not a value judgment as to Plaintiffs’ work.  Indeed, the 
purely private nature of some of the expressive conduct to 
which the Statutes apply requires additional sensitivity to the 
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core First Amendment values implicated in this case.  See 
Aiello, 623 F.2d at 854 (“A statutory scheme which 
encompasses the kind of expressive and associational activity 
that has been traditionally held to be entitled to a high degree 
of [F]irst [A]mendment protection should be subjected to 
closer judicial scrutiny than one which does not.”).  
Nevertheless, the Statutes’ broad legitimate sweep and the 
Government’s exceedingly compelling interest in this case 
counsels against facial overbreadth.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ 
First Amendment facial challenge to the Statutes fails. 
VI. 
 Finally, we address Plaintiffs’ claim that the inspection 
regime authorized by 28 C.F.R. § 75.5 violates the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Statutes require only that producers “shall 
make such records available to the Attorney General for 
inspection at all reasonable times.”  18 U.S.C. § 2257(c); id. 
§ 2257A(c).  But 28 C.F.R. § 75.5 authorizes law 
enforcement—without notice, a warrant, or even suspicion 
that a violation has occurred—to enter any establishment 
where a producer’s records under the Statutes are maintained 
to determine compliance.  Plaintiffs focus their Fourth 
Amendment claim on this regulation’s broad grant of 
authority.  Accordingly, we limit our analysis to this 
regulation and do not address any Fourth Amendment 
implications arising from the Statutes directly. 
A. 
 Before reaching the merits of Plaintiffs’ Fourth 
Amendment claim, we will address the Government’s 
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justiciability arguments.  The Government urges that 
Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue injunctive relief because 
they have not demonstrated sufficient threat of injury and 
their claims of future harm are not redressable through 
injunctive relief given that no inspection program under the 
Statutes has been in place since 2008.  The Government also 
points to this lack of an existing inspection regime as proof 
that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims are not ripe.   
 Standing to seek injunctive relief requires a plaintiff to 
show (1) “that he is under threat of suffering ‘injury in fact’ 
that is concrete and particularized”; (2) “the threat must be 
actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (3) “it 
must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant”; and (4) “it must be likely that a favorable judicial 
decision will prevent or redress the injury.”  Summers v. 
Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citing Friends 
of Earth, Inc. v Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 180–81 (2000)).  That some of FSC’s members have 
previously undergone searches pursuant to the regulations 
here is not sufficient on its own to confer standing to seek 
injunctive relief.  See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 
523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) (“‘Past exposure to illegal conduct 
does not in itself show a present case or controversy 
regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any 
continuing, present adverse effects.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974))); 
see also McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 225 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (past injuries “may suffice to confer individual 
standing for monetary relief” but “a plaintiff seeking 
injunctive relief must demonstrate a likelihood of future 
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harm”).  Accordingly, we will focus on the threat of future 
harm for the purposes of this standing inquiry. 
 Here, despite the lack of an existing inspection regime 
to implement § 75.5, Plaintiffs are suffering real costs as a 
condition of compliance with a regulation that they urge is 
unconstitutional.  Sufficient injury exists to confer standing 
where “the regulation is directed at [Plaintiffs] in particular; it 
requires them to make significant changes in their everyday 
business practices; [and] if they fail to observe the . . . rule 
they are quite clearly exposed to the imposition of strong 
sanctions,” even where there is no pending prosecution.  Pic-
A-State Pa., Inc. v. Reno, 76 F.3d 1294, 1300 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(third alteration in original) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 
387 U.S. 136, 154 (1967), abrogated on other grounds, 
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977)); see also 
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(standing exists where plaintiffs were “direct targets of an 
ordinance they allege to be unconstitutional, complaining of 
what that ordinance would compel them to do”), vacated on 
other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).  Here, those Plaintiffs 
who generate images covered under the Statutes face criminal 
prosecution if they do not make their records available for at 
least twenty hours per week as required by regulation.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 2257(f)(5); id. § 2257A(f)(5); 28 C.F.R § 75.5(c)(1).  
Even without a formal inspection regime in place, Plaintiffs 
must still comply with § 75.5’s requirements and be prepared 
to face an inspection without warning and at law 
enforcement’s discretion.  Each week, Plaintiffs either 
personally or through a custodian must arrange their 
businesses to have access to their records during specific 
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times.  The cost of complying with this regulation thus affects 
each producer of sexually explicit images in a concrete way 
that is sufficient to establish an injury-in-fact. 
 Compounding this injury is that the threat of future 
inspection is not remote, despite the Government’s assurances 
to the contrary.  There is no dispute that Plaintiffs intend to 
continue to engage in conduct that subjects them to the 
Statutes.  And nothing prevents law enforcement from 
resuming inspections pursuant to § 75.5, even if we accept the 
Government’s representation that it has no current plans to do 
so.  Further, although not sufficient on its own to support 
standing, the fact that some of FSC’s members have been 
subjected to records inspections in the past makes future 
inspections more credible.  See Susan B. Anthony List v. 
Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2345 (2014) (“[P]ast enforcement 
against the same conduct is good evidence that the threat of 
enforcement is not ‘chimerical.’” (quoting Steffel v. 
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974))).  Therefore, we 
conclude that Plaintiffs have also demonstrated that the threat 
of future harm is “actual and imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.”  Summers, 555 U.S. at 493. 
 Viewed this way, Plaintiffs’ injury is also redressable.  
“[S]tanding requires that there be redressability, which is ‘a 
showing that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.’”  Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 
347, 368 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Toll Bros. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 142 
(3d Cir. 2009)).  A declaration that § 75.5 is unconstitutional 
and an injunction barring the Government from conducting 
searches in the manner currently prescribed would alleviate 
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the costs associated with making records available for 
physical inspection twenty hours per week and remove the 
real threat of inspections described above.19  For these 
                                                 
19 The Government does not challenge the traceability 
requirement, and rightfully so.  There is no doubt that the 
challenged regulation caused the injury-in-fact of which 
Plaintiffs complain.  See Toll Bros., 555 F.3d at 142 (“If the 
injury-in-fact prong focuses on whether the plaintiff suffered 
harm, then the traceability prong focuses on who inflicted that 
harm.”). 
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reasons, we hold Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims are 
justiciable.20 
B. 
 We turn to the merits of Plaintiffs’ as-applied Fourth 
Amendment claim.21  In FSC I, we directed the District Court 
                                                 
20 For the same reasons, we hold Plaintiffs’ Fourth 
Amendment claim is also ripe.  Ripeness is a separate 
doctrine from standing, but both doctrines originate from the 
same Article III requirement of a case or controversy.  Susan 
B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2341 n.5 (citing 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 335 (2006)); 
see also Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian Church 
v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1994) (standing 
concerns “who may bring the action” and ripeness involves 
“when a proper party may bring an action” (emphasis 
added)).  Here, whether Plaintiffs have standing or their 
claims are ripe for adjudication both turn on whether the 
threat of future harm under the Statutes is sufficiently 
immediate to constitute a cognizable injury.  See Presbytery 
of N.J., 40 F.3d at 1462 (“[I]t is of course true that if no injury 
has occurred, the plaintiff can be told either that she cannot 
sue, or that she cannot sue yet.” (quoting Smith v. Wis. Dep’t 
of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 23 F.3d 1134, 1141 (7th 
Cir. 1994))).  Here, the threat of future inspections has caused 
Plaintiffs to incur ongoing costs to comply with the 
regulations.  Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs’ claims are 
ripe.   
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to consider whether an inspection under § 75.5 “was a 
‘search’ under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to either the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test set forth in [Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)] or the common-law-
trespass test described in [United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945 (2012)].”  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 544.  After developing a 
thorough record, the District Court concluded that the 
warrantless inspections conducted pursuant to regulation were 
searches under both tests.  As to the Katz analysis, the 
inspections invaded areas to which the public did not have 
access and in which there was a reasonable expectation of 
privacy (e.g., private offices, storage rooms, and residences).  
FSC II, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 602–03.  And the physical 
presence of law enforcement officers in those areas also 
constituted trespasses under the Jones framework.  Id. at 603–
04.  The Government does not contest this analysis, and we 
see no reason to reach a different conclusion. 
 The constitutionality of the warrantless searches under 
the Fourth Amendment thus rises and falls with the 
administrative search exception to the warrant requirement 
applicable to closely regulated industries.  “Searches 
conducted absent a warrant are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, subject to certain exceptions.”  United 
States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
“[T]he few situations in which a search may be conducted in 
the absence of a warrant have been carefully delineated and 
the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the 
                                                                                                             
21 Because § 75.5 as applied to Plaintiffs violates the Fourth 
Amendment, we need not, and do not, reach the issue of the 
regulations’ facial validity. 
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need for it.”  California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 589 n.5 
(1991) (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759–69 
(1979), overruled on other grounds by Acevedo, 500 U.S. 
565) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 But as we explained in FSC I, “[c]ertain industries 
have such a history of government oversight that no 
reasonable expectation of privacy could exist.”  677 F.3d at 
544.  Under these circumstances, “the warrant and probable-
cause requirements, which fulfill the traditional Fourth 
Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government 
search, have lessened application.”  New York v. Burger, 482 
U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (citation omitted).  Thus, “where the 
privacy interests of the owner are weakened and the 
government interests in regulating particular businesses are 
concomitantly heightened, a warrantless inspection of 
commercial premises may well be reasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”  Id.  Even if a business 
is determined to be part of a closely regulated industry, we 
must then consider whether the warrantless searches 
themselves are reasonable.  This requires examining whether 
“the following criteria are met: (1) the regulatory scheme 
furthers a substantial government interest; (2) the warrantless 
inspections are necessary to further the regulatory scheme; 
and (3) the inspection program, in terms of certainty and 
regularity of its application, is a constitutionally adequate 
substitute for a warrant.”  FSC I, 677 F.3d at 544 (citing 
Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03). 
1. 
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To determine whether an industry is closely regulated, 
factors to consider include the “duration of the regulation’s 
existence, pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme, and 
regularity of the regulation’s application.”  Id.  Here, the 
Government points to the fact that since 1978, Congress has 
criminalized the commercial use of children in sexually 
explicit materials.  See FSC I, 677 F.3d at 525.  Since 1988, 
Congress has imposed recordkeeping requirements similar to 
those currently embodied in § 2257.  Id.  Some regulation of 
sexually explicit images, even those not depicting children, 
has therefore been in place for some time. 
But the regulations in this area are not as pervasive as 
in other industries previously deemed closely regulated.  For 
example, in determining whether the Pennsylvania funeral 
industry was closely regulated, we looked to the “broad range 
of standards that funeral directors in Pennsylvania have long 
been required to comply with,” including licensing 
requirements, health standards, funeral home services 
requirements, federal pricing disclosure requirements, and 
OSHA safety standards.  Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 66 
(3d Cir. 2014).  Similarly, in finding the New Jersey horse-
racing industry closely regulated, we looked to the industry’s 
licensing requirements for all employees in the industry, 
prohibitions on employing individuals convicted of certain 
crimes, and the creation of the New Jersey Racing 
Commission with broad rulemaking authority.  Shoemaker v. 
Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1986).   
The Supreme Court has required a similar degree of 
pervasive regulation, with “the closely regulated industry . . . 
[being] the exception,” not the rule.  Marshall v. Barlow’s, 
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Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).  For example, in New York v. 
Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), the Court considered whether 
automobile junkyards were part of a closely regulated 
industry.  In finding them closely regulated, the Court 
observed that vehicle dismantlers were required to obtain a 
license, register with the state for a fee, and prominently 
display a registration number at the junkyard, on business 
documentation, and on any parts or vehicles passing through 
the business.  Id. at 704.  These regulations were backed by 
civil and criminal penalties.  Id.  Moreover, junkyards had 
been regulated for at least 140 years.  Id. at 707.   
In contrast with these industries, the Government fails 
to identify any similar requirements for producers of sexually 
explicit images.  Nor are the regulations that the Government 
does identify sufficient.  First, the prohibition of child 
pornography is a broad proscription of a class of images and 
does not directly target the industry in which Plaintiffs’ are 
engaged.  Nor could it.  Plaintiffs’ expression is 
constitutionally protected, while child pornography is not.  
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.  Indeed, enforcement of the ban 
is not limited to only those engaged in the business of 
producing sexually explicit images.  The ban on child 
pornography is therefore more appropriately considered a 
generally applicable criminal law, not the targeted regulation 
of any legitimate industry.  Although the nature of Plaintiffs’ 
businesses enhances the chance that they might run afoul of 
these laws, that alone does not justify deeming the entire 
industry closely regulated. 
Second, the Statutes themselves do not justify 
classifying producers of adult images as closely regulated.  
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To be sure, the Statutes require recordkeeping and labeling.  
Yet no one is required to obtain a license or register with the 
Government before producing a sexually explicit image.  An 
artist can pick up a camera and create an image subject to the 
Statutes without the knowledge of any third party, much less 
the Government.  Nor has the Government identified any 
regulations governing the manner in which individuals and 
businesses must produce sexually explicit images.  The 
creation of sexually explicit expression is better characterized 
by its lack of regulation than by a regime of rules governing 
such expression.   
The Government also cannot rely on the regulation’s 
provision for warrantless searches to itself establish that the 
industry is closely regulated.  The creation of sexually 
explicit images is not a “new or emerging industr[y]” to 
which the Government must respond to ensure public health 
and safety.  See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981) 
(noting that some new industries, at the time including the 
nuclear power industry, can be subject to warrantless searches 
despite “the recent vintage of regulation”).  We are doubtful 
that the Government can create the reduced expectation of 
privacy of a closely regulated industry to justify warrantless 
inspections by simply mandating those inspections, 
particularly where that industry existed long before the 
regulation’s enactment.  See Burger, 482 U.S. at 720 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he inspections themselves 
cannot be cited as proof of pervasive regulation justifying 
elimination of the warrant requirement; that would be obvious 
bootstrapping.”).  And in any event, as the Government 
readily acknowledges, no inspections have taken place since 
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2007.  This is hardly the “regularity of the regulation’s 
application,” FSC I, 677 F.3d at 544, that we would expect of 
a closely regulated industry.  For these reasons, we conclude 
that producers of sexually explicit images are not currently 
part of a closely regulated industry, and this exception to the 
warrant requirement does not apply. 
2. 
 This alone is sufficient to conclude that the warrantless 
searches authorized by regulation violate the Fourth 
Amendment as applied to Plaintiffs.  In the interest of 
completeness, we also address why those inspections are 
unreasonable, even if producers of sexually explicit images 
were closely regulated.  For this inquiry, we consider whether 
“(1) the regulatory scheme furthers a substantial government 
interest; (2) the warrantless inspections are necessary to 
further the regulatory scheme; and (3) the inspection program, 
in terms of certainty and regularity of its application, is a 
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.”  FSC I, 
677 F.3d at 544 (citing Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03).  We 
have already discussed the substantiality of the Government’s 
interest in protecting children with this regulatory scheme, so 
we need not dwell on the first criterion of this test.  And 
because we find the warrantless inspections here unnecessary, 
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we need not reach whether the inspection program is “a 
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.”22 
Warrantless inspections are necessary where a warrant 
would undercut the regulatory scheme.  But the Government 
“need not show that warrantless searches are the most 
necessary way to advance its regulatory interest.”  Heffner, 
745 F.3d at 68.  The need for warrantless searches is most 
clear where the “administrative inspection scheme[] . . . 
depend[s] on the element of surprise to both detect and deter 
violations.”  Id.  Thus, in Donovan v. Dewey, warrantless 
inspections to ensure mine safety were necessary because “a 
warrant requirement could significantly frustrate effective 
enforcement of the Act” given “the notorious ease with which 
many safety or health hazards may be concealed if advance 
warning of inspection is obtained.”  452 U.S. 594, 603 
(1981).  Similarly, inspections of firearms dealers and 
junkyards require unannounced, warrantless inspections to 
prevent the disposal of illicitly held items.  Burger, 482 U.S. 
at 710, 713 (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 
                                                 
22 The District Court considered these three criteria as factors, 
as opposed to independent requirements.  FSC II, 957 F. 
Supp. 2d at 605 (describing “three-factor Burger test”).  This 
was error.  As the Supreme Court explained, “[a] warrantless 
inspection, . . . even in the context of a pervasively regulated 
business, will be deemed to be reasonable only so long as 
[these] three criteria are met.”  Burger, 482 U.S. at 702 
(emphasis added).  In other words, even if an inspection 
program is an adequate replacement for a warrant, the 
Government must still demonstrate that warrantless 
inspections are necessary in the first instance. 
 63 
 
(1972)).  By contrast, where inspections target conditions that 
are “relatively difficult to conceal or to correct in a short 
time,” warrants may be required.  Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316 
(citing See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967)). 
Here, the Government has all but admitted that 
warrantless searches are unnecessary.  As the District Court 
found, “[b]oth FBI agents testified that it was highly unlikely 
that a producer could assemble Section 2257 records” on 
short notice.  FSC II, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 606.  And we agree 
with law enforcement’s testimony that the destruction of 
evidence is not a real concern, given that to do so would only 
compound any criminal violation of the Statutes.  Further, law 
enforcement here conducted nearly one third of its 
inspections under the Statutes after providing notice and 
without any reports of records fabrication.  Thus, the record 
establishes that the type of records required to be maintained, 
given their scope as well as the need for indexing and cross-
referencing, could not easily be recreated on short notice and 
violations concealed.  Under these circumstances, “inspection 
warrants could be required and privacy given a measure of 
protection with little if any threat to the effectiveness of the 
inspection system.”  Biswell, 406 U.S at 316.  Because 
warrantless searches are unnecessary, there is no need to 
sacrifice even administrative warrants and their 
accompanying “assurances from a neutral officer that the 
inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized 
by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan 
containing specific neutral criteria.”  Marshall, 436 U.S. at 
323; see also Martin v. Int’l Matex Tank Terminals-Bayonne, 
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928 F.2d 614, 621 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing relaxed 
requirements for administrative warrants).23 
VII. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s 
denial of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, except with 
regard to 28 C.F.R. § 75.5(c)(1).  We will remand to the 
District Court for further consideration of § 75.5(c)(1)’s 
constitutionality under the First Amendment.  We will also 
vacate that portion of the District Court’s judgment denying 
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, and we will remand to 
the District Court to enter a judgment declaring that the 
                                                 
23 Plaintiffs also urge that the regulations are unconstitutional 
because they do not provide for pre-enforcement review of 
law enforcement’s demand to conduct an inspection.  Because 
we conclude warrants are necessary, we need not reach this 
alternative argument. 
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warrantless searches authorized by 28 C.F.R. § 75.5 as 
applied to Plaintiffs violate the Fourth Amendment.24  
                                                 
24 Plaintiffs also renew their request for a permanent 
injunction.  The District Court’s denial of a permanent 
injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).  Relying 
on the Government’s 2008 disbandment of its inspection 
program, the District Court held that “Plaintiffs d[id] not face 
a realistic threat of ‘irreparable harm.’”  FSC II, 957 F. Supp. 
2d at 609.  We note that the existence vel non of a threat of 
irreparable harm is a different inquiry from whether Plaintiffs 
have demonstrated injury-in-fact sufficient to support 
standing, as discussed supra.  Because we do not perceive 
any abuse of discretion and Plaintiffs fail to argue otherwise, 
we decline to issue a permanent injunction. 
